On November 12, 2026, Hu Po, the founder of a Shanghai-based startup called Weilan NuEnergy, told the South China Morning Post that more than 20 private Chinese ventures were developing small modular reactors. The number itself is striking. The composition of the teams behind those ventures is more so.

One of them, Shanghai Junhe Atomic Technology, was founded in 2025 by Tian Jiashu. Tian spent nearly four decades inside China's state nuclear establishment. He served as deputy chief engineer at both China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) and China General Nuclear Power Corporation (CGN), and as director of the nuclear safety center under the former Ministry of Environmental Protection. He was also the chairman of the project company that developed the Linglong One, China's first commercial onshore SMR. Junhe Atomic raised a 300 million yuan ($44.1 million) angel-series round led by HongShan Capital, the former Sequoia China. Its plan is to deploy small reactors on the sites of retired coal-fired power stations, with commercial operation targeted for 2031.

Weilan NuEnergy, founded in March 2025, recruited Shen Chunyu — also transliterated as Xian Chunyu in some Chinese-language sources — the former chief designer of the Hualong One, China's third-generation large reactor, to lead its engineering. Hu Po said the startup cohort began forming rapidly in 2025, after the AI boom drove up electricity demand and private capital followed the state-backed deployments.

This is not a garage-startup story. It is the spillover of four decades of state nuclear construction into the private sector.

The Supply Chain That Makes 20 Startups Possible

The reason 20 private ventures can attempt to build SMRs in China, and the reason the U.S. cannot match that number, is not a difference in reactor physics. It is a difference in industrial infrastructure.

China has 29 conventional nuclear reactors under construction, nearly half of all commercial reactor buildouts worldwide, according to East Asia Brief. That construction program has produced a standardized supply chain for reactor pressure vessels, steam generators, coolant pumps, and containment modules. Private developers can procure parts locally. East Asia Brief noted that Chinese fabricators produce these components "at lower capital intensity than North American and European suppliers."

The Hualong One program illustrates the depth of that base. The reactor involved more than 5,300 equipment suppliers and over 60,000 component sets. All core equipment was domestic, with a localization rate above 88%. The first Hualong One unit at Fuqing began commercial operation in January 2021, 68 months after first concrete. Its cost was 20 to 30 percent lower than comparable foreign third-generation projects.

That cost figure is the part that matters for SMRs. A small reactor is not simply a scaled-down large reactor. But the manufacturing ecosystem, the workforce, and the regulatory experience that produce a Hualong One at 20-30 percent below international cost are the same inputs that make a private SMR startup in Shanghai viable.

Linglong One and the Deployment Gap

The state-backed Linglong One, also known as the ACP100, is the proof point the private ventures are building around.

The 125-megawatt reactor at Changjiang in Hainan province is the world's first commercial onshore SMR to pass the International Atomic Energy Agency's safety review, a milestone it reached in 2016. First concrete was poured in July 2021. Cold functional testing was completed in October 2025. Hot functional testing began in October 2026, verifying the primary cooling system at operating temperatures before fuel loading. Commercial operation was originally targeted for the first half of 2026, but the start of hot testing in October 2026 indicates the schedule has slipped; fuel loading and grid connection are now expected by the end of 2026 or early 2027. The plant is designed to generate 1 billion kilowatt-hours annually, enough for 526,000 households, with additional capacity for desalination and district heating.

The U.S. comparison is uncomfortable. America's most advanced SMR project, NuScale's UAMPS plant in Idaho, was cancelled in 2023 before construction began, after costs rose and the levelized cost of electricity climbed from $58/MWh to $89/MWh, with a per-kilowatt cost of $20,139. No U.S. commercial SMR has broken ground. NuScale, TerraPower, and GE Vernova Hitachi have all seen commercial deployment dates move toward 2030 or later. Elementl Power, an American developer, announced a $750 million partnership with South Korean investors in November 2026 to build BWRX-300 reactors in Ohio — targeting initial operation in 2034.

China will likely have a commercially operating onshore SMR before the United States finishes designing one.

The Export Playbook

The startup wave matters beyond China's borders because the export model is already visible.

CNNC has integrated SMR exports into the Belt and Road Initiative. It has held technical and commercial negotiations with Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, and Saudi Arabia. In July 2026, Argentina announced a $1.2 billion SMR project. Turkey has outlined plans for 20 SMRs. The Linglong One's IAEA certification is the credential that makes those conversations possible: it is the only SMR design that has cleared an international safety review, which matters for a buyer country's regulator and its financiers.

The export proposition is not just the reactor. It is the fuel, the maintenance, the spare parts, and the operating expertise that come with it. A country that buys a Chinese SMR is entering a multi-decade relationship with the Chinese nuclear supply chain. That is the same dynamic that has kept Russian Rosatom's export business durable despite Western sanctions. China is building the capacity to offer a similar package at a lower price point.

The private startups are not yet exporting. Junhe Atomic is still completing basic engineering designs. Weilan NuEnergy is aiming to secure commercial orders or break ground on a demonstration reactor within five years. But the state-backed Linglong One is the template, and the private ventures are the second wave. The export channel is being built while the first reactor is still completing hot testing.

Should the U.S. Worry? The Honest Answer

The question in the SCMP headline is the right one. The answer is more complicated than a simple yes or no.

The United States should not worry that China has solved a physics problem the U.S. cannot solve. The SMR concept is not a Chinese invention. NuScale's design was the first to receive U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission certification. The engineering challenges — modular fabrication, module interfaces, operational efficiency — are the same in Shanghai as they are in Idaho. A Junhe Atomic executive acknowledged that those bottlenecks remain unresolved even for the Chinese ventures.

The United States should worry about something more structural: the speed and cost at which China can deploy, and the export relationships that deployment creates. The Linglong One's construction timeline, if sustained, would be faster than any Western SMR has achieved. The Hualong One's 20-30 percent cost advantage over foreign peers suggests that Chinese fabricators can build nuclear components at a capital intensity that Western suppliers cannot match. The 20-plus startup cohort means that China is not relying on a single state champion; it is creating a competitive private ecosystem around the state-backed supply chain.

That ecosystem creates optionality. If one startup's design fails, another may succeed. If the state-backed Linglong One encounters delays, the private ventures provide a second path. The U.S. has one leading SMR developer and a handful of others; China has more than 20 ventures and a state program that has already poured concrete.

The worry is not that China will build a better reactor. The worry is that China will build enough reactors, fast enough and cheaply enough, to become the default supplier for countries that want nuclear power and cannot afford to wait for Western designs to reach commercialization in the 2030s.

What the Startup Wave Signals

The 20-plus Chinese SMR startups are less a sign of a technological breakthrough than a sign that China's nuclear industrial base has reached a scale where private capital can enter the sector with a credible path to deployment.

Tian Jiashu and Shen Chunyu did not leave their state positions to build reactors from scratch. They left to build reactors using the supply chain, the workforce, and the regulatory knowledge that the state had already created. The startups are downstream of the Hualong One and the Linglong One, not independent of them.

That is the model the United States cannot easily replicate. The U.S. has world-class reactor designers and a rigorous regulator. It does not have 29 reactors under construction, a standardized domestic supply chain for nuclear components, or a deep bench of experienced nuclear engineers who can be recruited into private ventures. The U.S. nuclear construction workforce has contracted over decades, and rebuilding it is a multi-year project that no single startup can undertake alone.

The question is not whether the United States should worry about 20 Chinese startups. The question is whether the United States can rebuild the industrial base that makes 20 startups possible. Until it does, the SMR race will be shaped less by who has the best design and more by who can actually build.

Sources: South China Morning Post (November 12, 2026); East Asia Brief (November 13, 2026); Jiemian News on Junhe Atomic's founding and financing (July 23, 2026); Tencent News on Junhe Atomic and Weilan NuEnergy (November 14, 2026); Introl on Linglong One timeline and specifications (February 8, 2026); NucNet on Linglong One cold functional testing (October 2025); East Asia Brief on Linglong One hot functional testing and China's reactor construction pipeline (November 13, 2026); Sohu and Toutiao on Hualong One supplier count and cost data (2021); SMR Intel and Cooperative.com on NuScale cost overruns and UAMPS cancellation (2026); CCEDIA on CNNC's Belt and Road SMR negotiations and Argentina/Turkey plans (July 24, 2026); U.S. nuclear workforce assessments via industry reporting (2026).

Disclaimer

The information provided in this article is for general informational and educational purposes only. It does not constitute legal, financial, or professional advice. The author and publisher are not responsible for any actions taken based on the content of this article. Readers should consult qualified professionals for advice specific to their situation. All trademarks and references to third-party products, services, or organizations are the property of their respective owners. The performance data and benchmarks discussed are based on specific research studies and may not generalize to all use cases or environments. As of the publication date, the AI landscape continues to evolve rapidly, and readers should verify current information independently.

Limitations

The "more than 20 startups" figure comes from a single founder's estimate, not a regulatory registry.

SMR cost comparisons rest on the Hualong One, a large reactor, as a proxy; no Chinese SMR has completed commercial operation yet.

Startup funding figures are drawn from public announcements and may not reflect total capital committed.

Deployment timelines are company and government projections, not verified completion dates.

Reporting standards and disclosure requirements differ between Chinese and U.S. sources, so figures are not always directly comparable.

Market size and forecast estimates come from research firms whose methodologies vary; treat them as directional.

The sectors discussed are changing quickly, and readers should verify current figures independently.


Sources

  1. South China Morning Post (November 12, 2026)
  2. East Asia Brief (November 13, 2026)
  3. Jiemian News on Junhe Atomic's founding and financing (July 23, 2026)
  4. Tencent News on Junhe Atomic and Weilan NuEnergy (November 14, 2026)
  5. Introl on Linglong One timeline and specifications (February 8, 2026)
  6. NucNet on Linglong One cold functional testing (October 2025)
  7. East Asia Brief on Linglong One hot functional testing and China's reactor construction pipeline (November 13, 2026)
  8. Sohu and Toutiao on Hualong One supplier count and cost data (2021)
  9. SMR Intel and Cooperative.com on NuScale cost overruns and UAMPS cancellation (2026)
  10. CCEDIA on CNNC's Belt and Road SMR negotiations and Argentina/Turkey plans (July 24, 2026)
  11. U.S. nuclear workforce assessments via industry reporting (2026).

The information provided in this article is for general informational and educational purposes only. It does not constitute legal, financial, or professional advice. The author and publisher are not responsible for any actions taken based on the content of this article. Readers should consult qualified professionals for advice specific to their situation. All trademarks and references to third-party products, services, or organizations are the property of their respective owners. The performance data and benchmarks discussed are based on specific research studies and may not generalize to all use cases or environments. As of the publication date, the AI landscape continues to evolve rapidly, and readers should verify current information independently.

Limitations: The "more than 20 startups" figure comes from a single founder's estimate, not a regulatory registry.; SMR cost comparisons rest on the Hualong One, a large reactor, as a proxy; no Chinese SMR has completed commercial operation yet.; Startup funding figures are drawn from public announcements and may not reflect total capital committed.; Deployment timelines are company and government projections, not verified completion dates.; Reporting standards and disclosure requirements differ between Chinese and U.S. sources, so figures are not always directly comparable.; Market size and forecast estimates come from research firms whose methodologies vary; treat them as directional.; The sectors discussed are changing quickly, and readers should verify current figures independently.